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Abstract: Composite indicators are very common in economic and business 
statistics for benchmarking the mutual and relative progress of countries in a variety 
of policy domains such as industrial competitiveness, sustainable development, 
globalisation and innovation. The proliferation of the production of composite 
indicators by all the major international organizations is a clear symptom of their 
political importance and operational relevance in policy-making. As a consequence, 
improvements in the way these indicators are constructed and used seem to be a very 
important research issue from both the theoretical and operational points of view . 
This paper shows that a theoretical inconsistency exists between the real theoretical 
meaning of weights and the meaning that is generally attributed to them by the 
standard practice in constructing composite indicators; thus, a recursive important 
mistake is present in most of the empirical applications. Guidelines to solve this 
drawback are given. 
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1. Introduction 
 Composite indicators (or indexes) are used whenever a plurality of variables is 
needed for the evaluation of a macroeconomic dimension. Composite indicators 
are very common in fields such as economic and business statistics (e.g., the 
OECD Composite of Leading Indicators) and are used in a variety of policy 
domains such as industrial competitiveness, sustainable development, quality of 
life assessment, globalisation, innovation or academic performance (see Cox and 
others 1992, Cribari-Neto et al 1999,  Färe et al. 1994, Griliches 1990, Forni et al. 
2001, Huggins 2003, Grupp and Mogee 2004, Lovell et al. 1995, Munda 2005, 
Nardo et al. 2005, Saisana and Tarantola 2002, and Wilson and Jones 2002, 
among others). The proliferation of these indicators is a clear symptom of their 
importance in policy-making, and operational relevance in macroeconomics in 
general (see e.g. Granger, 2001). All the major international organizations such as 
OECD, the EU, the World Economic Forum or the IMF are producing composite 
indicators in a wide variety of fields (Nardo et al., 2005). A general objective of 
most of these indicators is the ranking of countries and their benchmarking 
according to some aggregated dimensions (see e.g. Cherchye, 2001, K leinknecht 
2002 and OECD, 2003). As a consequence, the improve ment of the way these 
indicators are constructed and used seems to be a very important research issue 
from both theoretical and operational points of view. Our main objective here is to 
contribute to the improvement of the overall quality of composite indicators by 
looking at one of their technical weaknesses, that is, the consistency between the 
mathematical aggregation rule  used for their construction and the meaning of 
weights. Along the paper, concepts coming from measurement theory, multi-
criteria decision analysis and social choice are used. 
2. Linear Aggregation Rules and Meaning of Weights 
 Although various functional forms for the underlying aggregation rules of a 
composite indicator have been developed in the literature (e.g. Diewert, 1976, 
Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, 2002), in the standard practice, a 
composite indicator, I, can be considered a weighted linear aggregation rule 
applied to a set of variables (OECD, 2003, p. 5):  
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of weight.  
 The common practice in attaching weights is well synthesised by a recent 
OECD document: “Greater weight should be given to components which are 
considered to be more significant in the context of the particular composite 
indicator” (OECD, 2003, p. 10). In the decision theory literature, this concept of 
weights is usually referred to as symmetrical importance, that is "… if we have 
two non-equal numbers to construct a vector in R2, then it is preferable to place 
the greatest number in the position corresponding to the most important 
criterion." (Podinovskii, 1994, p. 241). Let’s try to put some light on this issue, by 
proving formally that the concept of symmetrical importance is incompatible with 
a linear aggregation rule, given that in a linear aggregation rule, weights can only 
have the meaning of a trade-off ratio  (see also Vincke, 1992, pp. 36-37). 
 Suppose that country a is evaluated according to some variables 
1( ( ),..., ( ))nx a x a , then the substitution rate at a, of the variable  j with respect to 
the variable  r (taken as a reference variable) is the amount ( )jrS a  such that, 
country b whose evaluations are: ( ) ( ), ,l lx a x b l j r= " ¹ ; ( ) ( ) 1j jx b x a= - ; and 
( ) ( ) ( )r r jrx b x a S a= +  is indifferent to country a. Therefore, ( )jrS a  is the amount 
which must be added to the variable  r in order to compensate the loss of one unit 
on variable  j for country a. Consider now a composite indicator I(x1, x2, ..., xn) 
and suppose that the score of this indicator is the same for the two countries. Let 
z(a)= (x1(a), x2(a), ...,  xn(a)) and z(b)= (x1(b), x2(b), ..., xn(b)), then as a first 
approximation one has: 
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When the function I is a weighted sum of all the normalised variable s, i.e. 
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from expression (2) one obtains: 
( ) constant.
w jaS jr wr
= =                                                                                        (4) 
 
This means that in the weighted linear aggregation, the substitution rates equal the 
weights of the variables up to a multiplicative coefficient. As a consequence, the 
estimation of weights is equivalent to that of substitution rates, implying a 
compensatory logic. Compensability refers to the existence of trade-offs, i.e. the 
possibility of offsetting a disadvantage on some variables by a sufficiently large 
advantage on another variable.  Therefore, the use of weights in combination with 
intensity of preference (given that variables are always supposed to be measured 
on an interval or ratio scale) within a linear aggregation rule originates 
compensatory aggregation conventions and gives the meaning of trade-offs to 
the weights.  
 In other words, in a linear aggregation framework, the weights always depend 
on the value of the trade-off. Such a trade-off holds a constant value, since in this 
context, the local trade-off (i.e. the marginal rate of substitution) is also the global 
one, i.e. it does not depend on the values that variable scores may have in a given 
point. However, one has to note that the trade-off always depends on the 
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measurement scale used for measuring the variable scores and on the range that 
the measurements of variable scores may present.  
To clarify the issue consider the  hypothetical example presented in Table 1. 
 
 GDP  
(Millions 
of Euro) 
Populations  
(Number of 
Inhabitants) 
Percentage 
of  
Protected 
Species 
A 32,000 1,000,000 60% 
B  80,000 3,000,000 70% 
C 100,000 5,000,000 40% 
Table 1. Illustrative Example with Three Countries and Three Variables 
 
 
 Consider first the measurement scale. Suppose that in the construction of a 
sustainability composite indicator, the trade-off between protected species and 
GDP is set such that a decrease of 1 point in the percentage of protected species 
can be compensated by an increase of 100,000,000 Euro of GDP. This trade-off 
can be expressed as 100,000,000species
GDP
w
w
= . If instead the measurement scales of 
GDP is changed and this variable is measured per capita, the same trade-off 
indicated above now would be modified e.g. in “1% of protected species less can 
be compensated by 100 Euro of GDP per capita more”. Thus in this case one 
has 100species
GDP
w
w
= .  Since the measurement scale of the variable protected species 
has not changed, the only weight that must change value is the one attached to 
GDP, that in the second case has to increase considerably (since the numerator 
remain constant and the value of the ratio decrease).  
 One obvious observation might be that in a composite  indicator variables are 
normalized and thus effects due to measurement scales should disappear. This, 
however is not true. Consider for example the normalization technique distance 
from the group leader, which assigns 100 to the leading alternative and other 
alternatives are ranked as percentage points away from the leader  (Saisana and 
Tarantola, 2002), that is  100
actualvalue
maximum value
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
.  By applying this normalization 
technique while keeping the original trade-off “ 1% decrease in species versus 
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100 million Euro GDP” one has to standardize the value 100 Mill. Euros 
according to the new scale. This is equivalent to dividing this value by the score 
of the country with the highest GDP: 3100 10
100,000
-= . When income is expressed 
as GDP per capita, then the trade off would now be “1% decrease in species 
versus  3100 3.125 10
32,000
-= ·  increase in GDP per capita” 1. Again trade-offs and 
corresponding weights must change according to the range of variation of the 
measurement scale  considered. One may easily check that this kind of 
consequences apply independently to the normalization technique chosen. The 
conclusion is that in the case of a linear aggregation rule, trade-offs depend on the 
scales of measurement, and since weights are connected to the values of trade-offs 
they also depend on the scales of measurement. 
 Clearly trade-offs can be evaluated only if one knows the quantitative scores of 
the variables involved without any uncertainty. On the contrary, the concept of 
importance is connected to the variable itself and NOT with its quantification. If 
protected species are considered more, equal or less important than GDP, this is a 
quality of the variables which is independent from any measurement scale one 
may use. As clearly shown by Anderson and Zalinski (1988), when weights 
depend on the range of variable scores, such as in the context of a linear 
aggregation rule, the interpretation of weights as a measurement of the 
psychological concept of importance is always completely inappropriate.  
 More formally,  to use the compensatory approach in practice, such as the 
linear aggregation rule, one has to determine for each individual indicator, a 
mapping : x Riif ®  which provides at least an interval scale of measurement 
and to assess scaling constants (i.e. weights) in order to specify how the 
compensability should be accomplished, given the scales if  between the different 
individual indicators (Roberts, 1979). Note that the scaling constants which 
appear in the  compensatory approach depend on the scales if , thus they do not 
characterise the intrinsic relative importance of individual indicators. The 
                                              
1 A is the country with the highest GDP per capita with 32,000 Euro, followed by B with 26,667 
and C with 20 ,000 Euro. 
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implication is the existence of a theoretical inconsistency in the way weights are 
actually used and their real theoretical meaning.  
 An overview of methods to attach weights in a multi-attribute value function 
framework (the general framework to which the linear aggregation rule belongs ) 
can be found in Beinat (1997) and Keeney and Raiffa (1976). There is unanimous 
agreement in the literature that the only method where weights are computed as 
scaling constants and there is no ambiguous interpretation is the so-called trade-
off method starting with revealed preferences. No weight importance judgment is 
required in this method. The trade-off method can be briefly described as follows. 
Let’s consider two countries A and B, differing only for the scores of variables xk 
and xt. The problem is then to adjust the score of say xk for B, in such a way that A 
and B become indifferent. Formally, it is:  
 
' ' '' ''
1 1( ) ( ) ( ,..., ,..., ,..., ) ( ,..., ,..., ,..., )k t n k t nI A I B I x x x x I x x x x= Û = Þ                       (5) 
' ' '' ''
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Equation (7) is an equation in the unknown wk and wt. To compute the N weights 
as trade-offs, it is necessary to assess N-1  equivalence relations which together 
with the usual normalisation constraint  w i+ … + w n=1  determine a linear system 
of N equations in the N unknown weights. Of course if some uncertainty on the 
variable scores exists, this method cannot be applied.  
 As one can easily understand to assess weights as trade-offs, as it should be 
always done when using a linear aggregation rule, it is a much harder job than to 
use weights as importance coefficients. This is probably the main reason why the 
standard practice tends to use weights as importance coefficients, but 
unfortunately this practice is not defensible on theoretical grounds. 
 Vansnick (1990) showed that the two main approaches in multi-criteria 
aggregation procedures i.e., the compensatory and non-compensatory ones can be 
directly derived from the seminal work of Borda and Condorcet. If one wants the 
weights to be interpreted as “importance coefficients” (or equivalently 
symmetrical importance of variables) non-compensatory aggregation procedures 
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must be used (Bouyssou, 1986; Bouyssou and Vansnick, 1986). From a social 
choice point of view, these non-compensatory rules are always Condorcet 
consistent rules; their use in the framework of composite indicators, can be 
corroborated by referring to a clear result of social choice literature. The majority 
rule is theoretically the most desirable aggregation rule, but practically often 
produces undesirable intransitivities, thus “more limited ambitions are 
compulsory. The next highest ambition for an aggregation algorithm is to be 
Condorcet” (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, p. 77).  
 Thus we can conclude that the use of non-compensatory aggregation rules to 
construct composite indicators is compulsory for reasons of theoretical 
consistency when weights with the meaning of importance coefficients are used. 
Moreover the  use of Condorcet consistent rules is also desirable  in general as 
advised by social choice literature. Unfortunately these considerations are 
completely neglected by the standard practice on composite indicators2. 
3. Conclusion 
The following main conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Weights in linear aggregation rules have always the meaning of trade-off 
ratio. Therefore, given that in the standard practice of constructions of a 
composite indicator, weights are used as importance coefficients  in 
combination with linear aggregation rules, a theoretical inconsistency 
exists. This inconsistency applies to most of the empirical applications. 
2. When a linear aggregation rule is used, the only method able to derive 
theoretically consistent weights is the so-called trade-off method. 
Operationally this method is very complex.  Moreover the assumption that 
the variable scores are measured on an interval or ratio scale of 
measurement and no uncertainty exists  must always apply. Rarely this 
happens in the practice of composite indicators, where for instance, 
sometimes quantitative scores are arbitrarily given to variable scores 
originally measured on an ordinal measurement scale  (see e.g. Nicoletti et 
al., 2000).  
                                              
2The only exception probably being the 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index, where at least 
some methodological weaknesses are acknowledged. http://www.yale.edu/esi/a_methodology.pdf  
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3. In standard composite indicators based on the linear aggregation rule , 
compensability among the different individual indicators must always be 
assumed; this implies complete substitutability among the various 
components considered. For example, in a hypothetical sustainability 
index, economic growth can always substitute any environmental 
destruction or inside e.g., the environmental dimension, clean air can 
compensate for a loss of potable water. From a descriptive point of view, 
such a complete compensability is often not desirable. 
4. Whenever weights are used with the meaning of importance coefficients, 
the aggregation algor ithm must be a Condorcet consistent rule. The use of 
these rules is desirable on more general grounds too. In particular, it 
should be noted that by using Condorcet aggregation rules no limitation on 
the measurement scale of the variable scores exists. The  cost to pay is that 
information on the intensity of preference may be lost. 
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